

## Reconsidering Mechanical Devices for Partial Stroke Valve Testing

Mike Mitchell

Cameron Flow Control / DYNATORQUE

Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center International  
Symposium : October 26-27, 2010

## Mechanical PST: Introduction




### **PST does not replace Full Stroke Test**

Lower the average probability of failure on demand ( $PFD_{AVG}$ ) between established full stroke test intervals

– or –


Increase time between full stroke test intervals while maintaining or lowering the  $PFD_{AVG}$  .



**$PFD_{AVG}$   
increases  
with time**

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## Partial and Full Stroke tests decrease $PFD_{AVG}$



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## Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) reflect relative levels of risk reduction



Table 3 – Safety integrity levels: probability of failure on demand


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Table 4 – Safety integrity levels: frequency of dangerous failures per hour



CONTINUOUS MODE OF OPERATION	
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1	$\geq 10^{-6}$ to $<10^{-5}$

## History of Mechanical PST - Linear






## History of Mechanical PST - Rotary







# History of Mechanical PST Early Design

## Disadvantages

- Each piece a unique design
  - Lack of consistency from plant to plant or even valve to valve.
  - Personnel training and product maintenance and replacement issues
- “Engineered in the shop” –reliability issues

# History of Mechanical PST Early Design

## Disadvantages

- “Pinch points”: fingers caught in the exposed mechanism.
- No safeguard against being left in the “engaged” position.
- Impractical to determine each unique device’s impact on SIL.

## Development of International Standards

IEC 61511 and ISA S84 allow for reduction of  $PFD_{AVG}$  by using partial stroke testing...

“For those applications where exercising the final trip element may not be practical”

Para 16.3.1.3 ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 Part 2 (IEC 61511-2 Mod)

## Development of International Standards

### CHALLENGE TO ENGINEER:

“Increase reliability of our Safety System.  
Assure the Emergency Shutdown Valve  
(ESD) has partial stroke test capability.”

## Development of International Standards

Standards are performance oriented, not prescriptive.

User decides method necessary to accomplish PST based on application, process, risk, etc.

## Development of International Standards

### DEFAULT THOUGHT:

“If I want this valve to do *something* I need to add *controls* to make it do that something.”

Instrumentation engineers  
and vendors naturally converged ....

## Development of International Standards

...to develop new and competing methods for accomplishing PST...


Positioners

Solenoid

Other control-based systems



## Controls Based PST Systems



## Controls Based PST Systems



## Development of International Standards

### The Mechanical Approach:

Why take an already complicated control system and make it more complex to solve the problem of making it more reliable?

Is there a simpler, less complex solution that will result in an acceptable methodology for PST?

## Mechanical Advantage: Benefits

No extraneous controls or devices in the control loop.

The control loop is kept as simple as possible

When the device is tested, all the actual components and controls stroke the ESD in the “real world” speed of operation.■

## Mechanical Advantage: Benefits

### Cost Savings

- Simpler control loop
- No additional power or wiring
- No instrumentation commissioning
- No calibration
- Minimal personnel training
- No Software / No Software Training
- No Programmers
- Field Retrofit

## Mechanical Advantage: Benefits

### Reliable and Viable

- Metal-to-metal:
  - Valve cannot travel past set point
  - Reduced Spurious Maintenance Alarms
- Limit Switches can provide status to control room
- Human Interface / Visual Inspection
- SIL Capable / FMEDA

## “Direct Interface” Mounting

**Any Actuator**




**Mechanical Device**




**Driver**



**Any Rotary Valve**




## “Direct Interface” Mounting







## Mounting and Torque Range



- Direct Interface Mount to small or large valves.
- For Actuator Torque output to millions of lb-in

# Mechanical Characteristics and Operation





# Mechanical Characteristics and Operation




# Mechanical Characteristics and Operation








## Mechanical Partial Stroke Test Device




**ISA S-84 - IEC 61508 and IEC 61511  
SIL Capable**








# Mechanical Characteristics and Operation




**Disengaged**




**Engaged**

# Mechanical Characteristics and Operation





**Disengaged**




**Engaged**

## Mechanical Advantage: Metal to Metal Safety




**Mechanical Device fully "engaged"**

## Mechanical: How it Works





## Operation of Mechanical PST Device



## Human-Machine Interface


### Inspection Requirements

#### 16.3.2 Inspection:

Each SIS shall be periodically visually inspected to ensure there are no unauthorized modifications and no observable deterioration (for example, missing bolts or instrument covers, rusted brackets, open wires, broken conduits, broken heat tracing, and missing insulation).


From 16.3.2 of ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 Part 1 (IEC 61511-1 Mod) © ISA 2004

## Remote Operation of Mechanical PST Device







## Remote Operation of Mechanical PST Device



## Remote Operation of Mechanical PST Device




## Remote Operation of Mechanical PST Device




***Pilot actuator spring holds engagement cam in disengaged position. Valve is free to fully open and close.***

## Remote Operation of Mechanical PST Device




***Pilot actuator is energized and engagement cam in is engaged position. Valve is partially stroked.***

## Remote Operation of Mechanical PST Device



***All devices in normal operation condition. Test is complete.***
















## Remote Operation of Mechanical PST Device




# Pneumatic Actuators in the Real World





“Ideal Cylinder”: Smooth Acting


## Pneumatic Actuators in the Real World



ESD is Seldom Stroked


Cylinders are not  
necessarily repeatable

Stiction is “normal”



“Real World Cylinder”: Stiction

## Pneumatic Actuators in the Real World



- Stiction is “normal”
- “normal” may equal spurious alarms
- “normal” may equal costly non-essential maintenance

## Mechanical Aspects of Electronic Systems








DVC6000 series digital valve controller requires one of the following

- Intel i486 Software - Version 7.3 or later
- Intel i486 Intelligent Device Manager - DVC6000 Device Rev 2
- 286 Field Communicator - DVC6000 Device Rev 2
- 286 Multi Communicator - DVC6000 Device Rev 2


For more information, visit [www.fms.sony.com](http://www.fms.sony.com) for the latest information.













## Mechanical Advantage: Metal to Metal Safety



**Device fully "engaged"**



# Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) reflect relative levels of risk reduction

Table 3 – Safety integrity levels: probability of failure on demand

DEMAND MODE OF OPERATION		
Safety Integrity Level (SIL)	Average Probability of Failure on Demand	Risk Reduction
4	$\geq 10^{-5}$ to $<10^{-4}$	$>10,000$ to $\leq 100,000$
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Table 4 – Safety integrity levels: frequency of dangerous failures per hour

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## Mechanical Device Impact on SIL

**Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) to determine Average Probability of Failure on Demand ( $PDF_{AVG}$ )**

## Mechanical Device Impact on SIL

**Mechanical Device shown to have  
 $PFD_{AVG}$  as low as  $1.36E-04$**

Rachel Amkreutz, Lindsey Bredemeyer, Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis,  
Project D-Stop Partial Stroke Test Device, Exida

## Mechanical Device Impact on SIL

***Mechanical PST Device  $PFD_{AVG}$  1.36E-04***

Generic scotch yoke actuator » 1.5E-03

Generic rack and pinion actuator » 5.7E-03

Generic floating ball valve » 3.5E-03

Generic resilient butterfly valve » 5.7E-03

Generic HPBV / Triple Offset Butterfly valves » 8.5E-03

Source: R. van Beurden-Amkreutz, Exida

## Mechanical Advantage: Benefits

Device requires no extraneous controls or devices in the control loop.

The control loop is kept as simple as possible

When the device is tested, all the actual components and controls stroke the ESD in the “real world” speed of operation.

## Mechanical Advantage: Benefits

### Cost Savings


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## Mechanical Advantage: Benefits

### Reliable and Viable

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## Remote Automation of Mechanical Partial Stroke Test Devices

Mike Mitchell

Cameron Flow Control / DYNATORQUE

Valve World – 24 September 2009

## Mechanical PST During ESD

And if we have time....

## Mechanical PST During ESD

What happens if my system needs to  
ESD during Mechanical PST?

## Mechanical PST During ESD

What is the *probability* of ESD occurrence when the mechanical device is engaged?

What is the *likelihood* of ESD occurrence at the time of PST? (When is an ESD event likely to occur?)

## Mechanical PST During ESD

First: what is the *probability* of ESD occurrence when the mechanical device is engaged?

## Mechanical PST During ESD

**Assume PST 1x per 4 weeks  
5 minutes per test**

$$\frac{5 \text{ minutes}}{40,320 \text{ minutes}}$$

**Available 99.99% of the time**



## Mechanical PST During ESD

**D-Stop 1.36E-04**

**3.85E-05**

**Reality: PST 1x per 90 Days  
5 minutes per test**

**5 minutes**  

---

**129,600 minutes**

**Available 99.9999615% of the time**

## Mechanical PST During ESD

Second: what is the *likelihood* of ESD occurrence at the time of PST?

(Or: when is an ESD event likely to occur?)

## Mechanical PST During ESD

### When do Accidents Happen?

Worker activities associated with fire and explosion deaths in industrial workplaces:

- Repair and maintenance activities 28%
- Welding 24 %
- Construction / Installation 13%

Welding accounted for 1/3 of all incidents

## Mechanical PST During ESD

### When do Accidents Happen?

“Non-normal” times:

- Bad weather
- Plant start up
- Plant shut downs
- Maintenance turnarounds
- Construction

## Mechanical PST During ESD

### When do Accidents Happen?

Conclusion: ESD will most likely occur during times we would NOT *schedule* a PST.

Manual PST will be scheduled during "normal" or "routine" plant operations when time, weather and other conditions allow for such routine maintenance activities to occur.


## Mechanical PST During ESD

### When do Accidents Happen?

**99.99 %**

**99.9999615%**

Is it statistically significant that an ESD will occur during non-availability *and* during the most *unlikely* conditions to perform a mechanical Partial Stroke Test?



## Reconsidering Mechanical Devices for Partial Stroke Valve Testing

Mike Mitchell

Cameron Flow Control / DYNATORQUE

Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center International  
Symposium : October 26-27, 2010



